The paper argues that the origins of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 can ultimately be located in four spaces: in international financial centres, in particular, in the longstanding competition that has existed between London and New York; in the insularity of the everyday geographies of money that have emerged in such centres in the wake of the apparent hegemony of financialization; in the geographical recycling of surpluses and deficits and more particularly the structural dependency that has grown up between China and the United States, and; finally, in the growing power of the financial media, centred in international financial centres and an increasingly significant agent in performing money and the economy in general, and in engendering mimetic forms of rationality.
worked its way through to hedge funds too, producing 30 per cent fall in the value of assets held during 2008 (IFSL Research, 2009) . Consequently, funds are being forced to close at a growing rate amidst predictions that as many as half of the approximately 7,000 existing hedge funds are likely to disappear, despite claims to be able to deliver positive 'absolute returns' in both bear and bull markets (Economist, 2008) . The difference in the level of publicity surrounding the fortunes of investment banks and hedge funds may be the fact that hedge funds will simply be allowed to die, rather than be the subjects of state-sponsored rescues. Second, the response to the financial crisis during 2008 represents a remarkable about-turn in the state's attitude toward financial markets as the US and UK governments, through unprecedented acts of financial intervention, rejected nearly four decades of neoliberal financial reregulation. To prevent wider systemic failure and contagion there has been an effective nationalisation of failing financial institutions in the US (such as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG) followed by the Troubled Asset Relief Plan (TARP) 'bailout' designed to take 'toxic' loans off the balance sheets of financial institutions, but whose funds have primarily been used to try to recapitalisation ailing banks, while the UK also engineered episodes of nationalisation (for example, Northern Rock), 'shotgun marriages' to save failing institutions (such as the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TSB and Bradford & Bingley by Banco Santander, for example), as well as an unprecedented 'rescue plan' for the entire banking British banking sector which involved it being underwritten by the public purse. These actions represent a body blow to the ideological purity of market-led ideas of neoliberal financialization that had hitherto dominated Anglo-American economy, society and polity. Nowhere is this better illustrated than in the curious standoff between democratic and republican members of the US Senate Banking Committee during the Autumn of 2008 over the TARP which was originally intended to ameliorate financial stress by providing a $700 billion financial rescue plan through the purchase by the state of failing financial assets from distressed institutions. While both parties agreed that the plan was flawed, they did so for opposing reasons: on the one hand, the Democrats criticised the bailout for the injustice of socialising market losses and transferring the cost of failure to the broader population; on the other hand, the Republicans also bridled at the socialisation of risk, but not for its equity effects, rather for violating the principles of the free market. Third, the problems associated with the failure of securitization are likely to prove particularly complex, intractable and costly for at least three further reasons. For one, the breakdown of trust in the calibration and metrics of risk by the rating agencies that has hitherto underpinned the spread of the securitisation model (Sinclair, 2008) . For another, the fungibility of such securities and their very power to shrink time and space, has meant that most major economic regions of the world will be implicated to some extent in the process of deleveraging and a concomitant fall in the value of assets (Wade, 2008) . Finally, the very complexity of modern financial instruments makes them extraordinarily difficult to unwind. In the final analysis, the critics who argued that financial markets had fallen in love with instruments that, when combined, produced levels of risk that were impossible to calculate were proved right. Rocket scientists knew the math alright. But it appears that in this instance a model doth not a market make, or at least when markets move outside the particular norms that historical data can dictate (cf. MacKenzie, 2006) 1 .
Our sense that we are witnessing an epochal shift within the global financial system may yet prove to be unfounded -although as each day of this extraordinary crisis passes, any sense that we shall return to financial business 'as normal' seems increasingly
unlikely -but what recent events have revealed beyond doubt is the extent to which an understanding of the historical geography of money and finance is essential to an apprehension of the volatile financial world in which we currently find ourselves. Above all, this is a crisis of financial space. The reference to Harvey at the start of the paper is appropriate, given his formative role in the development of geographies of money (Leyshon, 1995) . Money and finance does not just have a geography, it is inherently geographical, and money and finance has evolved as a technology for bridging space and time (Harvey, 1989; Leyshon and Thrift, 1997) . In what follows, we therefore attempt to locate the origins of the crisis through four geographical prisms: financial centres; the quotidian geographies of money, the global geoeconomics and geopolitics of money, and the financial media.
Our approach will be based on near event description for the simple reason that events are still unfolding (Thrift, 2005) . It seems to us that this kind of description is important currently for three reasons. First, there is no definitive theoretical framework that can fit all of the facts as they currently exist. Second, it follows that a portion of what can be said can only be speculation. We are living, even more than usual, in a state of uncertainty, not only because it has become impossible to value many assets or guarantee all the promises upon which the international financial system depends (Wolf, financial centre for at least 100 years. Although other centres have sought to challenge New York and London for this status -notably Tokyo in the 1980s -by the time the crisis broke they were rated as by far the largest and most important financial centres in the world by the financial community (Mainelli and Yearle, 2007) (see Table 1 ). In the past, this position was allocated to the centre that was located in the world's most dominant economy and was home to the international reserve currency. For example, the mantle of preeminent financial centre passed from London to New York in the wake of the First World War as Britain was transformed from the world's leading creditor nation to a position of indebtedness due to the loans it received from the United States to prosecute the war. On this understanding, New York should have enjoyed an unchallenged status as the foremost international financial centre, given the enduring strength of the US economy over the twentieth century and the role of the dollar as international numeraire, underwritten after 1944 by the Bretton Woods agreement.
However, from the late 1950s onwards, London was able to take advantage of the inherent weaknesses of the Bretton Woods system to usher in a new era of competitive reregulation between international financial centres. In short, in order to attract increasingly mobile and fluid capital flows there has effectively been a race to the bottom in terms of the regulation of financial activity which has given an advantage to those centres able and willing to offer a 'light touch' regulatory environment. In much of the policy debate following the financial crisis, there has been a good deal of concern about the role of offshore financial centres, and the need to reign in the ability to channel money through lightly regulated tax havens (The Economist, 2009) . However, it is often overlooked that this process of regulatory arbitrage (Leyshon, 1992) But close links between the political and financial classes were not confined to London, where a belief in the perspicacity of financiers saw them recruited to hold forth on all kinds of matters that one might consider beyond their natural purview. 2 The flow of financiers between New York and government in Washington was even more marked, and here the money men got their hands directly on the levers of power, with the result that 'a whole generation of policy makers has been mesmerized by Wall Street, always and utterly convinced that whatever the banks said was true' which led to 'a river of deregulatory policies' (Johnson, 2009) .
From this perspective the move toward 'light touch' (or, as some would argue, 'soft touch') regulation, is an important causal factor in the current crisis, and a product not only of narrow sectoral and political interest, but also of spatial competition, as institutions and regulatory authorities have competed with one another to capture highly lucrative and prestigious financial business. This race to the bottom in terms of regulation was facilitated by a general sense that financial markets and products were too complicated to be regulated by those outside the market, and the belief that financial institutions were sufficiently sophisticated and forward thinking to develop risk assessment models that would ensure their long-term survival and avoid systemic financial crisis.
3 It was also bolstered by a pervasive ideology that assumed markets were somehow rational, logical and, most importantly, self-correcting (French and Leyshon, 2004 ). This mode of thinking and ideology was institutionalised in the international regulatory framework of Basel II, which was predicated on the concept of prudential regulation, and displaced the regulatory gaze from financial risks themselves toward the risk assessment systems employed by financial institutions. In turn, internal risk assessment systems were underwritten by privatised quasi-regulatory bodies such as credit rating and international bond rating agencies (Sinclair, 2005) . As the financial crisis of 2007-2008 has illustrated this system was not without its problems, to put it mildly.
One of the most immediate and unwelcome, certainly for the 'masters of the universe' who inhabit international financial centres, consequences of the crisis has been the strong political and public response to what has been perceived as a culture of irresponsible risk-taking by financiers, reflected in the widespread public damnation of City 'spivs' and speculators, and the more general ethos of 'punterism' (Guthrie, 2008) .
Many commentators have drawn satisfaction from the immediate pain of the crisis being borne by those who benefitted from the ramp in financial markets. However, this satisfaction has been tempered as the financial crisis has been transformed into a more general economic crisis, and as the realisation has dawned of the degree to which many of these very same speculators have continued to benefit from the bonus culture.
Though the immediate impacts of the downturn will be felt keenly in international financial centres, they have increasingly rippled out through ancillary services as well as to labour and housing markets more generally. In particular, smaller, more regionally-based provincial financial centres are likely to be disproportionately affected, particularly as capacity is drastically reduced in call centres and back office functions which are often located in these centres (Bailey and French, 2005) . 
Quotidian Geographies of Money
Turning now to the question of the everyday geographies of the crisis, one of the remarkable things about this financial crisis has been the manner in which it has appeared to take nearly all practitioners and commentators close to the industry by surprise (for an exception see Lewis, 2008) . Although there was clearly a significant social rupture in processes of recruitment within leading international financial centres in the 1980s and 1990s, manifest in the widespread adoption of Americanised and more meritocratic employment practices, the inability to predict the crisis suggests that financial centres and their participants continue to occupy a very insular world. There are a number of reasons for this state of affairs, of which three are particularly important.
First, there is the very power and influence of neo-classical economics and of the idea of self-regulating markets. Economic theory has failed to adequately theorise the role of asset-price inflation, which is often dismissed as a relatively unimportant part of forecasting models in that it is comprehended as a market-clearing mechanism which induces short-term periods of disequilibrium, and yet the crisis hinged in large part upon exactly this phenomenon especially within the housing sector within financialised economies such as those within the US and the UK (Erturk et al., 2008) . Second, as a system, the world of money and finance has become an ever more complex, intricate and technical field which means that it is increasingly difficult for those who are not embedded in financial epistemic communities to understand, let alone be able to intervene in. In this respect we are reminded of debates in critical geopolitics about the increasingly insular and self-referential nature of international deliberations on nuclear proliferation and defence strategy during the Cold War (Dalby, 1990). As a highly technical and opaque set of epistemic communities and discursive fields the world of finance, like that of post-war nuclear defence strategy, has effectively been placed beyond democratic scrutiny. As such the world of money and finance that has dominated since at least the 1980s might be considered, in the terms of neo-Gramscian theory, to be a distinctive historic bloc, the 'ethical' power of which was at least partly derived from the market-based solutions it appeared to offer to the perennial problem of financial exclusion (Leyshon and Tickell, 1994) . A third reason was the relationship that existed between the world of finance and the 'real economy' which increasingly became one in which the financial system extracted value out of other sectors, its ability to do so being founded in the power of money, which strengthened considerably over the latter part of the twentieth century. Traditional views of the role of the financial system within the economy saw it as a source of capital investment to be used in long-term productive growth, whereas in truth in recent years the power of the financial system has enabled it to see the rest of the economy as a repository of assets that can be acquired, sweated and leveraged to generate income streams (Leyshon and Thrift, 2007; Erturk et al. 2008 ).
This divide was particularly manifest in the days during and immediately after the crisis. In the United States at least, there were public declarations of two worlds working in opposition to one another, these being Wall Street and Main Street. To some extent this is entirely understandable given the egregious injustices and 'quiet violence' (Tickell, 1996) meted out to many ordinary savers and borrowers, ranging from forced foreclosures of homes to general anxiety about the safety of hard-earned money placed on deposit to secure financial futures. However, it is important to recognise that amidst the many examples of predatory lending, reckless risk taking, the craven pursuit of bonuses by many participants in the financial sector and, in the case of the Madoff Hedge Fund, out and out fraudulent behaviour, some of the financial instruments developed in recent years have had the capacity to bridge the divide between Wall Street and Main Street and in so doing bring about socially progressive outcomes. Thus, despite the very real problems that have beset the sub-prime mortgage market in the US, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that for many Americans the sub-prime mortgage offered the only route to home ownership (Dymski, 2008) . In focusing exclusively on the dark side of sub-prime lending there is a danger that we unwittingly reinforce right wing critiques of financial inclusion which insist that people are excluded from the market for very good reasons: they do not and cannot conform to the normative and linear borrower subjectivities expected and demanded by financial providers (French, et al. 2008; Langley, 2008; Seabrooke, 2006) . Although in the way in which it has been prosecuted, sub-prime lending has often led to socially regressive outcomes (Wyly, et al, 2006; , it did not have to be this way and this particular financial technology has the capacity to recycle funds in such a way as to underwrite more progressive and sustainable forms of financial citizenship (see Shiller, 2008) . In many respects, the orgy of sub-prime lending in the United States represents a high tide mark of a particular form of market-based financial inclusion. However, given that the boom in sub-prime lending was driven more by commission-based selling and the search for short-term bonuses rather than a genuine desire to broaden financial citizenship in the long-term, it is perhaps hardly surprising that the tide of financial inclusion has dramatically ebbed leaving even more people stranded at the margins of the financial system. A new class of financially (re)excluded is now forming for whom there is little hope of gaining access to mainstream financial products anytime soon, their only alternative being exploitative and largely unregulated providers.
Global Geoeconomics and Geopolitics
The geographical recycling of surpluses and deficits has always been critical to the institutions with considerable opportunities to make money from the intermediation of these funds at different spatial scales. However, the breaking of the sub-prime crisis ensured that this was not to be the case.
The way in which this mutually beneficial relationship broke down has some striking similarities to the factors that, in the end, brought about the Less Developed
Countries crisis in the 1980s. First, existing financial markets were insufficient to absorb the sheer volume of money being recycled through Western financial centres. In the 1970s, this led to the production of an entirely new market, which was making large loans to sovereign borrowers based in the most part in the less developed economies of Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. After the late 1990s, financial institutions sought out new markets wherever they might be, which included a return to those developing economies which had for so long been embargoed from lending in the wake of the debt crisis of the 1980s, but now re-imagined as 'emerging markets' (Sidaway and Pryke, 2000; Sidaway and Bryson, 2002) . But most of the new markets after the late 1990s were developed within the leading economies themselves, mainly through the device of securitised lending to both prime and, significantly, sub-prime borrowers. Indeed, Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) have made an even more direct parallel, by arguing that the sub-prime crisis can be seen as one that is predicated upon the recycling of funds to a 'less developed economy' within the boundaries of the United States itself; that is, to the spaces of urban poverty and deprivation that were previously beyond the purview of the mainstream financial system. Through the lens of Harvey (1982) , both the Less Developed Countries Debt Crisis and the financial crisis of 2007-08 are examples of the ways in which financial capitalism uses space and time in an attempt to develop new markets offset a decline in profit levels and a destruction of value. Second, in addition to being newly emerging markets, both sovereign lending in the 1970s and sub-prime lending in the 1990s were attractive in a period of financial expansion because they offered potentially high returns on investment precisely because they did not have the same risk profile as standard markets. Such markets were not merely attractive, but were also necessary in order to realise the high returns that have been demanded under general conditions of financialization (Erturk et al. 2008) . Third, just as in the 1970s and 1980s, the attempt to displace risk through practices of syndicalisation was undermined by the volume of lending and inevitable entanglement of all the leading financial institutions. In the current crisis there was an analogous attempt to displace and disperse risk, but this time through sophisticated and complex processes of securitisation including the creation of consumer asset-backed securities, derivatives such as credit default swaps and new financial entities such as special purpose vehicles and so on. Once again, assumptions that such practices somehow dissipate and distribute risk through out the international financial system to such an extent that individual financial institutions were insulated and protected from default proved catastrophically misplaced. The sheer complexity and opacity of many of these devices meant that the risk assessment systems implemented both within organisations and imposed upon them by external regulators such as bond rating agencies were simply not up to the task (Langley, 2008c) .
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A further consequence of the crisis has been to remind us that beneath the veneer of an open, liberal and globalised economy, economic nationalism remains very close to the surface. One example was the rapid breakdown in the relationship between the UK and Iceland. Iceland was among a number of small countries which during the NICE decade took advantage of having relatively high rates of inflation and even higher interest rates to attract to it flows of investment looking for high rates of return (Wade, 2008) . Its banks, in turn, turned the economy into something akin to a national hedge fund, as the funds drawn to it were used to leverage investments elsewhere. However, as the crisis broke these positions began to unravel, and one after another Icelandic banks collapsed only to be rescued via nationalisation. One of the ways in which these banks had attracted money onto their balance sheets was through the creation of retail subsidiaries in a number of European states, including Britain. As the Icelandic banks collapsed, so the savings of thousands of British investors evaporated as it was discovered that they were not covered by UK deposit insurance. In order to protect these deposits, the UK government mobilised anti-terrorist legislation to freeze the UK assets of Icelandic banks, causing a deep rift between the nations and Iceland to consider initiating legal action against the UK (Ibison, 2008) . Similar tensions have emerged even between EU partner countries, such as that between the UK and German over the size and scale of fiscal stimuli packages, as policy makers struggle to frame and make sense of the crisis and its aftermath (Parker et al, 2008) .
The Financial Media
The final element which we need to add into the spatial jigsaw is the media, the key means by which the power of what Marazzi (2008) has called a 'mimetic rationality' has been strengthened, the imitative herd behaviour which is based on the information deficits of individual investors and which produces both market momentum and liquidity , 2009) . Third, the financial media have produced a spotlight on institutions in difficulty which has itself produced further difficulties. Whatever the exact case, the markets, and then the general population, were sure that they were suffering a financial blitzkrieg, with immediate results for liquidity and subsequently general consumer confidence.
Not the least of the difficulties that the media produce is their inability to consider their own situation, either their own inherent excitability which comes from the need to sell stories into a market for attention, boosted by the power of images to affect the public mood, from their role in using privileged access to act as a conduit for government or corporate spin, even including actions like forcing down share prices, and from their general closeness to government and finance. Their defence is usually the public interest. Of course, there have been instances in the last crisis when the media have shown restraint, for example, over the rescue of Northern Rock, but these have been few and far between. And it is often a close-run judgement as to where such restraint becomes a blight on the public interest, a situation made much more difficult by the rise of the so-called 24 hour news cycle which has consisted not only of a general speed-up in the transmission of news but equally the rise of new 'fast' news channels (typified by operations like CNN and CNBC), and the veritable host of often nontransparent means of 'instant' reporting and comments born out of the internet. These new channels often disseminate rumour at great speed as though it were verified news, so-called 'churnalism' (Rosenberg and Feldman, 2008) .
Conclusions
The current crisis is a crisis which has arisen from an active use of space at a range of scales and along networks of varying length which connect individuals and institutions to, and enrol them within, the financial system. The crisis has been a map of financial flows, of differential wealth effects, of areas hardest hit, and of crises of actors of various kinds. These range from politico-jurisdictional spaces at one level-think only of the dire financial condition of New York state or of the Icelandic economy -through institutions such as universities and local governments at another -think only of North American private Universities whose endowments have been hard hit and whose students can no longer access the loans they were used to getting on a semester by semester basis, and UK local authorities who lost money deposited in high interest savings accounts in Iceland who are now forced to cut jobs and down services to reduce costs -to the myriad individuals affected by the fall out from problems such as these as well as those directly involved with predatory lenders, and subsequent acts of delinquency, default and foreclosure (Langley, 2008) . But, more than that, space has been a constituent factor in the formation and unfolding of the crisis. As we have tried to show in this paper, space has acted as a means of both identifying and accelerating markets and investments which can then bite back as the geographies of markets and investments are quite literally unravelled. There has been a geographical calling to account, the costs of which have still to be fully reckoned. In the lead up to the crisis, during the long-run financial boom, places were increasingly linked to one another through transfers of surpluses gleaned from production and the build up of deficits generated through consumption; layers of promises to pay were piled on top of one another and then stretched across the world in apparently endlessly elastic ways.
However, for reasons that we have outlined in this paper, the confident organized uncertainty of the financial boom (Power, 2007) has been transformed into a reduced world of disorganized uncertainty, and not a little fear. In a remarkably short period of time, the horizons of the world economy appear to have been reduced, as exports and imports, and the economies that they both supported, have shrunk. There has been a new focus on national economies, and in particular on the powers of salvation vested in the fiscal state and ability of individual taxpayers to rescue financial capitalism. In all this, geography not only matters, it hurts, and will continue to do so for a considerable time.
However, what we should also be attuned to is the way in which the financial system may already be reinventing itself in the midst of crisis. It was during the turmoil of the Less Developed Countries Debt Crisis that the financial system moved strongly towards securitisation in response to the damage down to the balance sheets of major banks and the fact that many leading companies and governments found themselves with much strong credit ratings, making it possible for them to find their activities in ways that circumvented traditional intermediation altogether. It is precisely at such moments of crisis that new forms of activity are forged and given momentum as established paths and procedures are closed off, and its highly liked that a new financial paradigm is already in the making.
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